Ajay Arun Mehta
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Practice note · 2026-10-02 · By CA Arun Mehta

The Supplier Never Existed. Whose Credit Is It?

Where the supplier existed and supplied the goods but did not deposit the tax, the Calcutta, Madras and Gauhati High Courts have held that a bona fide purchaser cannot be denied credit without the department first proceeding against the supplier, but the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shaurya Alloys (P) Ltd v. State of Punjab (1 October 2026) declined to read the provision down and laid down fourteen guidelines. Where the allegation is that nothing was supplied, the burden under section 155 remains on the claimant, and an invoice and proof of bank payment are not enough without evidence of the physical movement of the goods.

A notice alleging wrongly availed input tax credit usually makes one of two quite different allegations, and the reply is not the same for both.

In the first, the supplier existed, raised an invoice, delivered the goods and was paid, and then failed to deposit the tax. In the second, the supplier was a shell, registered to issue invoices and nothing else, with no goods ever moving. The notice frequently does not separate them. The orders do.

Where the supplier defaulted: the recipient is not the collecting agent

Section 16(2)(c) allows credit only where the tax charged has been "actually paid to the Government". Read literally, it puts the recipient at the mercy of a person over whom he has no control.

The Delhi High Court declined to read the equivalent VAT provision literally. In Arise India Ltd and On Quest Merchandising India (P) Ltd v. Government of NCT of Delhi, [2018] 56 GSTR 177 (Delhi), section 9(2)(g) of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act was challenged as violative of Article 14, and the Court read down the expression "dealer or class of dealers" as not including a purchasing dealer who had bona fide bought from a validly registered selling dealer against a tax invoice where there was no mismatch.

The Gauhati High Court has carried that into GST, though — as the next section sets out — Punjab and Haryana has since declined to follow it. In National Plasto Moulding v. State of Assam, WP(C) 2863 of 2022, decided 4 August 2024, a Division Bench held that the vires of sections 16(2)(c) and 16(2)(d) of the Assam GST Act can "be taken care of by reading down the said provisions" by applying On Quest. It was a batch of writ petitions, and the Court set aside the show cause notices and the consequential orders before it. Its proposition, as reproduced in the judgments that follow it, is that for the failure of the selling dealer to deposit the tax, the purchasing dealer cannot be punished.

That is now applied in that Court as settled. In Metal Syndicate v. Union of India, WP(C) 2960 of 2026, decided 4 June 2026, a proprietary concern at Silchar faced a demand of Rs 78,70,952 — IGST of Rs 47,12,010, CGST of Rs 15,52,967 and SGST of Rs 16,05,975 — for July 2017 to March 2019, with interest and penalty, by an order-in-original of 19 February 2024. Standing counsel for the CGST "fairly submits that the issue raised in the present proceeding is squarely covered" by National Plasto Moulding, and both the order-in-original and the order-in-appeal were set aside. Advance Engineering Farms and Equipments v. State of Assam, WP(C) 4312 of 2024, decided 15 July 2026, reached the same result on a rectification order for 2017-18.

The caveat travels with the rule, and it is the part to read twice. National Plasto Moulding is explicit that "the Department is free to act in those cases, where the purchase transactions are not bona fide, in accordance with law." The reading down protects the bona fide purchaser. It protects nobody else.

That route is now contested, and the contest is live

On 1 October 2026 the Punjab and Haryana High Court decided a batch of 424 writ petitions on exactly this question. Shaurya Alloys (P) Ltd v. State of Punjab, CWP 34296 of 2024 and connected matters, was reserved on 21 August 2026 and pronounced by Chief Justice Ashwani Kumar Mishra and Rohit Kapoor J. The question it framed was what obligation lies on a purchasing dealer who has already paid the tax to his supplier, when he has no means of knowing whether the supplier deposited it.

The Court refused to invalidate the provision, and it refused to read it down. On the vires:

Section 16(2)(c) of the Act of 2017 does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity warranting its invalidation, though, as we shall presently indicate, it cannot be construed and applied as a standalone provision.

And on the route taken at Gauhati and Delhi, in terms:

Judicial discipline, therefore, also counsels us against reading down the provision on the lines of Gheru Lal Bal Chand (supra) and On Quest (supra), so as to confine its operation only to cases of fraud, collusion or non-existent transactions. The challenge to the vires of Section 16(2)(c), read with Section 155 of the Act of 2017, is accordingly repelled.

Two things drove that. The Gujarat High Court in Maruti Enterprises had already upheld the validity of section 16(2)(c). And the Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition against it in Bhandari Scrap Traders v. Union of India, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1570, by order dated 24 July 2026 — observing, as the Punjab and Haryana Court records, that no parity can be drawn between the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 and the GST Act so as to treat a purchasing dealer under the latter on par with a bona fide purchasing dealer under the former.

That observation goes to the root of the reading-down route, because On Quest is a DVAT decision and the analogy is the whole of its force in a GST case. A practitioner should no longer open on National Plasto Moulding without knowing which High Court he is in front of.

What survives, and it is a great deal

Upholding the provision did not end the matter. The Court said so at once — "Upholding the validity of the provision, however, does not conclude the matter" — and then laid down fourteen guidelines which, by the last of them, "shall govern all proceedings pending before the proper officers as well as proceedings initiated hereafter."

The protection has moved from the construction of the section to the conduct of the officer, and for most files that is the more useful place for it. The guidelines that will decide ordinary cases:

  • No mechanical invocation. Retrospective cancellation of the supplier's registration, a nil or short return by him, or an alert or complaint "may furnish a legitimate starting point for an inquiry, but shall not, by themselves, constitute the basis for denial or reversal of ITC availed by the purchasing dealer."
  • The officer must record satisfaction before issuing the notice on the supplier's particulars, the precise nature of the default, the circumstances in which he failed to deposit, and what proceedings have been taken against him and with what result.
  • The notice must disclose the material, and the documents relied upon — alert notices, inspection reports, panchnamas, statements recorded in investigation, e-way bill, vehicle registration, toll and banking data — must be supplied to the noticee.
  • Section 74 needs foundational facts in the notice itself. A bald recital will not do, and "the deficiency cannot be supplied by a counter affidavit or by subsequent explanation". Above all: "The fraud of the selling dealer shall not be attributed to the purchasing dealer unless the notice discloses the facts connecting the purchasing dealer with such fraud."
  • The section 155 burden stands, and so does the way to discharge it — the tax invoice, proof of receipt of the goods, e-way bills, transport receipts, weighbridge slips, and stock and consumption records, which the officer must consider and deal with in the order.
  • No double recovery. Where the tax has been recovered from or deposited by the selling dealer, that must be taken into account "so that the same tax is not realised twice", with re-availment under the proviso to section 41(2) and Rule 37A.
  • The law as it stood in the tax period applies. The Court separated three phases — before 1 October 2022, from that date, and from 26 December 2022 when Rule 37A was inserted — and held that a later condition, including clause (aa) of section 16(2) from 1 January 2022, cannot be applied to an earlier period. For periods before Rule 37A there was no re-availment mechanism at all, and that must be borne in mind.
  • The purchaser's own registration is not to be cancelled merely because he took credit from a supplier later deregistered, without independent satisfaction under section 29(2).
  • Cross-examination of third parties whose statements are relied on must be decided by a reasoned order.

On the individual cases the Court did not interfere with the impugned orders. It gave eight weeks to file replies, directed the proper officer to decide afresh in the light of the guidelines, barred fresh coercive recovery meanwhile, left all pleas open, and made clear that nothing prevents the Department proceeding against the defaulting selling dealers.

The enquiry has to reach the supplier first

Even where the provision is applied as it stands, the Courts have insisted on a sequence.

Suncraft Energy (P) Ltd v. Assistant Commissioner of State Tax, MAT 1218 of 2023, was decided by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court on 2 August 2023. The facts are the ones that produce most of these notices. A show cause notice of 6 December 2022 proposed a demand of excess credit for 2017-18 founded on nothing but the difference between Form GSTR-2A and Form GSTR-3B on purchases from one supplier. The appellant replied twice, in January 2023, saying it had paid the tax to that supplier. The Assistant Commissioner reversed the credit anyway on 20 February 2023, and the Single Judge declined to interfere. On appeal the Court held:

The first respondent without resorting to any action against the fourth respondent who is the selling dealer has ignored the tax invoices produced by the appellant as well as the bank statement to substantiate that they have paid the price for the goods and services rendered as well as the tax payable there on, the action of the first respondent has to be branded as arbitrarily.

The direction was that the authorities must first proceed against the selling dealer, and only in an exceptional case, where there has been collusion between the two or where the supplier is missing or has closed business, can proceedings be taken against the recipient.

Two supports underpin it. Form GSTR-2A, on Union of India v. Bharti Airtel Ltd, is "only a facilitator for taking a confirm decision while doing such self-assessment", so a mismatch in it is not a finding of anything. And the CBIC press release of 18 October 2018 said as much.

Suncraft was applied on 15 September 2026 in Termico Engineers and Erectors (P) Ltd v. Deputy Commissioner of Revenue, WPA 18141 of 2026, where a show cause notice for cancellation of registration was quashed and the section 61 scrutiny notice remitted for a reply to be considered in the light of Suncraft.

The older authority is D.Y. Beathel Enterprises v. State Tax Officer, WP(MD) 2127 of 2021, decided 24 February 2021, where the sellers had collected the tax and not remitted it. The Madras High Court was unsparing about where the enquiry had gone:

When it has come out that the seller has collected tax from the purchasing dealers, the omission on the part of the seller to remit the tax in question must have been viewed very seriously and strict action ought to have been initiated against him.

The orders were quashed, the enquiry was to be held afresh with the sellers examined as witnesses, and recovery action against them was to be initiated in parallel.

The practical question to put to any such order is therefore a short one: was the supplier examined? If the demand rests on a GSTR-2A mismatch and nothing was done to the supplier, that is the ground.

The counterweight: the burden is still on the person claiming

None of the above shifts the onus.

Section 155 provides that where a person claims he is eligible for input tax credit, "the burden of proving such claim shall lie on such person". Rule 36 sets the documentary conditions.

State of Karnataka v. Ecom Gill Coffee Trading (P) Ltd, (2023) 18 SCC 809, is a VAT decision, but the Orissa High Court applied its guidance in the GST context in Manoja Kumar Nayak v. Commissioner, GST and Central Excise, WP(C) 12682 of 2025, decided 8 April 2026. What was under challenge was an order-in-original of 3 February 2025 under section 74 for 2017-18 which levied tax equivalent to credit the assessee had already reversed in his subsequent returns, with interest under section 50 and penalty on top. At paragraph 8.19 it held that mere production of tax invoices and proof of payment through banking channels is insufficient to prove a genuine transaction, and that to rebut a notice under section 74 the recipient is required to provide additional evidence, "such as: e-way bills and vehicle tracking data; proof of physical delivery (weighbridge slips, gate passes)."

That sentence is the specification of the file. An invoice and a bank statement answer Suncraft. They do not answer Ecom Gill.

Two Karnataka revision petitions, decided under the VAT Act but on the same question, mark the edges. In Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals)-6 v. Alankar Stones (P) Ltd, STRP 61 of 2025, decided 17 September 2026, the dispute went back to a Form VAT-275 notice of 18 March 2015 for April 2011 to March 2012 and concerned the reversal of credit of Rs 82,877 on suppliers who had not declared the transactions. The claim had been rejected both for failure to discharge the burden and for the selling dealer's non-payment; the assessee had produced documents and e-sugams establishing the movement of goods, which is precisely what Ecom Gill asks for, and the rejection did not survive. In K M Jayesh v. State of Karnataka, STRP 51 of 2025, decided 9 April 2026, the Tribunal had applied Ecom Gill to returns filed before that judgment was delivered; the High Court held that the authorities "were not justified in applying the said judgment retrospectively", set aside the orders and remitted the matter.

Section 74 is not a cure for a lapsed section 73

This is the most useful part of Manoja Kumar Nayak, and it is a limitation point rather than a point on the merits.

The facts are the ordinary ones. A DGGI alert notice named the supplier, M/s Auxesia Traders, as non-existent. A letter of 12 July 2024 asked the recipient to reverse credit of ₹4,39,970. He reversed it at once. The show cause notice under section 74 followed on 26 July 2024, for transactions of August to December 2017, which the Court noted was "conspicuously after 8 years of the alleged transactions."

The reasoning ran as follows. Section 73 carries a limitation, and it had elapsed. Section 74 requires fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax, and those "circumstances are spelt out, which in the humble opinion of this Court are absent in the present case." Instruction No. 05/2023-GST dated 13 December 2023 impresses upon every field formation not to invoke section 74 mechanically. On Northern Operating Systems (P) Ltd and Lipi Boilers Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2025) 11 SCR 578, "in the absence of any deliberate act on the part of the assessee with an intention to evade being established by the revenue, the essential precondition of wilful suppression with intent to evade duty is not satisfied." The Revenue having failed to establish a wilful intention to evade, the credit could not be held to have been wrongly availed by reason of fraud or suppression.

The reversal itself told in the assessee's favour. The Court recorded that "the petitioner has shown bona fide by reversing the amount of input tax credit the moment a letter from the Superintendent (Anti-Evasion) was issued bringing such conduct of the supplier to his notice."

The same jurisdictional approach appears, on quite different facts, in Bhagya Kalita v. Union of India, WP(C) 6154 of 2024, decided by the Gauhati High Court on 8 September 2026. That was a works contract price-adjustment matter rather than a fake invoice case, but the Court interfered at the stage of the show cause notice itself, treating the pre-conditions for section 74 as jurisdictional facts which must be found before the power is assumed. On maintainability it relied on Godrej Sara Lee Ltd, where the Supreme Court held that an alternative remedy is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than an absolute bar.

Interest and penalty where the credit was reversed

Three further holdings in Manoja Kumar Nayak are each worth taking separately.

No interest where the ledger carried the balance. Section 50(3) read with Rule 88B and Circular No. 192/04/2023-GST dated 17 July 2023 leaves "no ambiguity that when the Electronic Credit Ledger has sufficient balance left for adjustment of reversal of input tax credit no interest is chargeable or payable under Section 50."

Penalty cannot be mechanical. The credit having been reversed before the section 74 proceeding began, and there being no tax implication, "the imposition of penalty cannot be a mechanical exercise of power and, thus such order is unsustainable."

Demanding tax equal to credit already reversed is double taxation. In terms: "raising demand of 'tax' equivalent to the amount of 'input tax credit' already reversed would tantamount to subjecting a person to double taxation and is, therefore, liable to be nullified."

The order-in-original was quashed and both writ petitions were allowed.

Blocking of the credit ledger under Rule 86A

Rule 86A has a discipline of its own. The power is exercisable where the officer "has reasons to believe" that the credit was fraudulently availed or that the person was ineligible, which the Madras High Court in Tvl. J.M. Traders v. Deputy Commissioner (ST), W.P. No. 1387 of 2024, treated as requiring both an objective satisfaction and reasons that are recorded.

The remedy must still be pursued, and promptly. In SSAP Traders v. Deputy Commissioner (CT), WP(MD) 26344 of 2026, decided 11 September 2026, credit of Rs 1,34,93,312 had been blocked across two orders of May and June 2026, and the petitioner came for a mandamus to unblock Rs 97,84,048 of it. The writ was dismissed. Blocking runs for one year under Rule 86A(3), and once the credit is blocked it is "incumbent on the part of the petitioner to move an application inviting the Commissioner to pass an order under Rule 86A(2)". The petitioner had "kept quiet all this while" and was held to be seeking to take advantage of J.M. Traders. Liberty was given to challenge the DRC-07 and then ask for unblocking.

Where the writ court will not go

A caution on forum. On 7 September 2026 the Delhi High Court disposed of a substantial batch, of which Singhal Trading India (P) Ltd v. Union of India, W.P.(C) 7290 of 2026, is one. They arose out of a single investigation into the trade in TMT bars and allied iron and steel products — the lead petitioner had surrendered its own GST registration with effect from 25 February 2023 — and raised challenges to penalty under section 122, the retrospective application of section 122(1A), and evidentiary objections. The Court relegated the petitioners to the appellate authority, directing it to examine all grounds, including the questions left open, "on their own merits and uninfluenced by any observations made herein". It also held that appeals from notices issued before 1 October 2025 are governed by section 107(6) as it stood at the date of the notice.

The division is reasonably clear. Where the dispute is about the sufficiency of the evidence, the writ court will ordinarily send it to the appellate authority. Where it is about the jurisdiction to issue the notice at all, Bhagya Kalita shows that it may not.

In short

  1. Read the notice for which allegation it actually makes. Supplier defaulted, or supplier never existed. They are answered differently, and the orders do not treat them alike.
  2. Where the supplier defaulted, the first question is what was done to the supplier. Suncraft and D.Y. Beathel both turn on that omission.
  3. Check which High Court you are in before you lead on National Plasto Moulding. Gauhati reads section 16(2)(c) down; Punjab and Haryana in Shaurya Alloys expressly declined to, Gujarat upheld the provision, and the Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition. Where the route is shut, the Shaurya Alloys guidelines do the same work through the conduct of the officer.
  4. Build the file to the Ecom Gill standard, not the Suncraft standard. E-way bills, vehicle and transport records, weighbridge slips, gate passes, a quantitative tally. The invoice and the bank statement are the floor.
  5. Check the limitation before the merits. If the period under section 73 has run out and section 74 has been invoked without any finding of intent to evade, that is the stronger ground.
  6. Reverse early where the credit is indefensible, and record why. In Manoja Kumar Nayak prompt reversal became evidence of bona fides and defeated the penalty.
  7. Check the credit ledger balance. With a sufficient balance no interest arises under section 50(3) read with Rule 88B.
  8. Resist a demand for tax equal to credit already reversed. That is double taxation.
  9. If the ledger is blocked, apply under Rule 86A(2) at once. Silence cost SSAP Traders the writ.

Where the registrant has been through insolvency, a notice for periods before the plan was approved raises a prior question, taken up in A GST Notice After the Resolution Plan: When the Demand Is Already Extinguished.

The income tax analogue, where the question is not the credit but the quantum of the addition, is dealt with separately in Alleged Bogus Purchases: What the Addition Comes To.

This note is general information drawn from reported decisions and is not advice upon any particular matter. The lines of authority described above subsist alongside one another, and the outcome in any case depends upon its own record.

Questions this answers

Can input tax credit be denied because the supplier did not deposit the tax?
Not from a bona fide purchaser without more. In Suncraft Energy Pvt Ltd v. Assistant Commissioner of State Tax, MAT 1218 of 2023, decided 2 August 2023, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the authorities must first proceed against the selling dealer, and only in an exceptional case, such as collusion or where the supplier is missing or has closed business, can recovery be made from the recipient. The Gauhati High Court in National Plasto Moulding v. State of Assam, WP(C) 2863 of 2022, decided 4 August 2024, read down sections 16(2)(c) and 16(2)(d) of the Assam GST Act following On Quest Merchandising India (P) Ltd, [2018] 56 GSTR 177 (Delhi), holding that the purchasing dealer cannot be punished for the selling dealer failing to deposit the tax. Both carry the same express caveat: the department remains free to act where the transactions are not bona fide. The route is not uniform, however. In Shaurya Alloys (P) Ltd v. State of Punjab, CWP 34296 of 2024, decided 1 October 2026, the Punjab and Haryana High Court repelled the challenge to the vires and declined to read the provision down on the lines of On Quest, noting that the Supreme Court had dismissed the special leave petition against the Gujarat High Court in Maruti Enterprises. It laid down fourteen guidelines instead, which forbid mechanical invocation and govern all pending and future proceedings.
Are an invoice and proof of payment through the bank sufficient to establish the credit?
No. Section 155 places the burden of proving the claim on the person making it. Applying State of Karnataka v. Ecom Gill Coffee Trading (P) Ltd, (2023) 18 SCC 809, the Orissa High Court in Manoja Kumar Nayak v. Commissioner, GST and Central Excise, WP(C) 12682 of 2025, decided 8 April 2026, held at paragraph 8.19 that mere production of tax invoices and proof of payment through banking channels is insufficient, and that the recipient must furnish further evidence such as e-way bills and vehicle tracking data, and proof of physical delivery by weighbridge slips and gate passes.
Can a notice under section 74 be issued once the period under section 73 has expired?
Not merely because the earlier period has run out. In Manoja Kumar Nayak the show cause notice under section 74 was issued on 26 July 2024 for transactions of August to December 2017, which the Orissa High Court described as conspicuously after eight years. It held that the circumstances required for section 74, namely fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade tax, were absent, noted Instruction No. 05/2023-GST dated 13 December 2023 directing field formations not to invoke section 74 mechanically, and quashed the order-in-original. It also held that no interest arose under section 50(3) read with Rule 88B because the electronic credit ledger carried a sufficient balance, and that demanding tax equal to credit already reversed would amount to double taxation.

More practice notes

Holding one of these yourself?

Every assessment turns on its own record. A note like this one tells you what the tribunals have accepted; it cannot tell you whether your papers carry it. Bring the notice in before the reply is drafted, not after.

Notice Assessment Session — 30 minutes, ₹5,000 + gst. A defence outline: the points to take, the documents to assemble, and the date each step falls due.